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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
KOLAND LAVAE DENISON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
—vs.—
ALVIN D. CHAPMAN, CONTINENTAL
OIL COMPANY, a corporation, and
DOEA HAETLEY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Civil
No. 8554

EESPONDENTS' ALVIN D. CHAPMAN AND
CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY'S BEIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We cannot accept the statement of facts as set forth
in the appellant's brief. While we recognize that in a
case where a verdict has been directed in favor of the
respondents, the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the appellant, we believe that counsel for the appellant
has overlooked the equally familiar principle that the
testimony of a witness can be no stronger than it is left
on cross-examination. In the instant suit, there is very
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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little conflict in the evidence. All of the witnesses were
called by the plaintiff, and there is no substantial dispute in their testimony. The facts relevant to the issues
of this appeal may be briefly stated as follows:
On the evening of the accident, the defendant Dora
Hartley was enroute to a meeting in Orem (T. 63). She
entered U.S. Highway 91 from the east side thereof, at
the point where it is intersected by what is known as the
Carterville Eoad (T. 63). Prior to entering the highway, Mrs. Hartley stopped in response to ,a stop sign,
and observed for traffic approaching from the left or
south (T. 64). She observed the Continental Oil truck
approaching at a distance about two blocks away (T. 65).
She entered the highway ,and proceeded northerly along
the extreme easterly edge of the highway (T. 66). She
was not certain whether she was entirely in the right
hand lane of the highway, or partially in the right hand
lane and partially on the right shoulder (T. 68, 73, 74).
The street was covered with ice, and the lines marking
the lanes of traffic were not visible (T. 68). The rear
wheels of her car were equipped with snow tires, and it
was in good mechanical condition (T. 66). She proceeded very slowly up the hill, at a rate of speed estimated by her at approximately 15 miles per hour (T. 67).
She had had previous experience in driving this hill
under wintry conditions; and she was cognizant of the
perils involved (T. 67). She had her car completely
under control (T. 68). At about the time the oil truck
reached her (in the left hand lane for north bound
traffic), she suddenly ("quick as a flash") lost control
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of her car, and it spun in a counter-clockwise direction
("spun sideways out into the lane of traffic") (T. 70, 71).
I t made only about a quarter of a turn when it came
forcibly into collision with something else, and then spun
clockwise, finally coming to rest on the right hand, or
east shoulder of the highway, and facing in a southerly
direction (T. 71). None of the foregoing testimony is
disputed by any other witness.
The defendant Chapman, operator of the oil truck,
testified that he had stopped for the semaphore light at
the bottom of the Orem hill (T. 90). When the light
changed to green in his favor, he started up the hill in the
extreme right hand lane. He observed the Hartley car in
the lane ahead of him, (T. 86), and as he approached it,
he swung out into the center lane to pass (T. 91). She
did not appear to be having any difficulty, nor did her
car appear to be out of control (T. 87, 90). As he was
about to pass her car, it suddenly went out of control,
and slipped or skidded into the pathway of his truck,
coming into collision therewith, and causing him to lose
control (T. 91, 93, 94). Notwithstanding Chapman's
efforts to iiold the truck on the right side of the road
(T. 93), it slid diagonally across the highway, where it
finally came to rest with the front end against the guardrail on the west side of the highway (T. 94). At about
the time the truck came to rest, it was struck by the
plaintiff's automobile (T. 95). This testimony of Chapman is also undisputed.
The plaintiff testified that on the afternoon of the
accident, he had been with his boys attending to their
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horses in the northern part of Orem (T. 115). It had
been snowing all afternoon (T. 115). They were returning to their home, but at about the top of the Orem Hill,
the plaintiff decided to drive down the hill to the service
station to fill his tank with gasoline (T. 118). On direct
examination he testified that he was traveling at about
35 miles per hour two blocks north of the top of the hill,
(T. 116), but that he slowed down, although to what
extent he did not know, anticipating that he would turn
off the highway toward his home (T. 117). After he
started down the hill, he never again used the accelerator,
(T. 117), and after testing his brakes and finding that
they would not decelerate his car, he shifted down into
second gear to further reduce his speed (T. 118). However, on cross-examination he admitted that according
to his best judgment he was traveling 35 miles per hour
at the top of the hill, (T. 131), and at a point only 200
feet north of the point of impact, he was traveling at
30 miles per hour (T. 132). He was aware of the danger
of an accident when the defendant's truck was 50 to 60
feet away, (T. 122), but he was unable to stop in time
to avoid a collision, and he struck the truck with such
force and violence that his car bounced back up the hill
six to eight feet (T. 15, 128), and both vehicles were
damaged to the extent of $1200 (T. 132). That he was
going at a speed of 35 miles per hour at the top of the
hill was corroborated by his son Douglas (T. 153). The
plaintiff admitted that he had lived in Orem for 7 years ;
that he was thoroughly familiar with the Orem Hill;
that in periods of adverse weather, the hill was usually
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more slippery and difficult than the level road; and
that he had reason to anticipate that the hill would be
more slippery than the level road on the night of the
accident (T. 128).
Mrs. Hartley testified that after the accident, the
plaintiff said that he was going too fast for existing conditions (T. 75, 76, 78, 80, 81). He did not deny making
such an admission (T. 127).
I t is true that officers Levin and Loveless testified,
over objection, that in their opinion, the maximum safe
speed on the Orem hill on the evening of the accident
was 10 to 15 miles per hour, (Levin) (T. 19); or 20 miles
per hour, (Loveless) (T. 43). We believe that this was
inadmissible opinion evidence, since it called for a conclusion on a subject on which laymen are capable of forming valid opinions without the need for expert assistance.
However, both witnesses admitted, on cross-examination,
that they had had no experience in operating a transport
truck and trailer of the kind being operated by Chapman,
and that their opinions were based purely upon their
experience in operating ordinary passenger type vehicles (T. 32, 45). They admitted that they were not
qualified to give an opinion as to what would be a safe
speed for a truck and trailer having in mind the difference in weight, traction, controllability, etc. (T. 31, 32,
45, 46). On the other hand, the witness Chapman who
had had considerable experience in the management of
such equipment, (T. 98, 99), testified that in his opinion,
35 miles per hour was a safe speed for the truck and
trailer on the evening of the accident, and a safer speed
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than a lesser speed would have been (T. 105, 111, 112).
He pointed out that at lesser speeds, there would be
dangers of the equipment stalling on the highway, or
"spinning out," which would imperil not only that equipment, but also other traffic on the highway (T. 104,105,
108). The opinion of Chiapman was the only opinion of a
qualified witness as to the safe speed for the operation
of a tank truck and trailer, and is not disputed or controverted by any admissible evidence.
We particularly wish to note our dissent to the statement on page 2 of the appellant's brief, that Denison
slowed down to about 15 miles per hour as he approached
the crest of the hill. We have searched the record in vain
for any testimony to support that statement. There is
considerable evidence to the contrary, which comes from
the mouth of the plaintiff himself, and his infant son.
We also disagree with the statement that Chapman was
approximately one foot west of the dividing line between
the two north traffic lanes. The only basis for such a
statement is the opinion testimony of Officer Levin that
the point of impact was one foot west of the dividing line
(T. 21). But Chapman testified that he was "right
against" or "over a little bit" from the center line (T.
91). The evidence shows without dispute that Mrs. Hartley was at all times on the extreme right hand side of the
road, and that Chapman was in the proper lane to pass
the Hartley automobile.
All of the witnesses agreed that at the time and place
of the accident, the highway was covered with ice, and
was extremely slippery.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE BELIED UPON
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT
CHAPMAN ATTEMPTED TO PASS THE HARTLEY AUTOMOBILE AT A DISTANCE SO CLOSE THAT THE JURY
WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE.

POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT CHAPMAN WAS NOT DRIVING AT
AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPEED, AND THE ACCIDENT
WAS NOT CAUSED BY ANY EXCESSIVE SPEED ON THE
PART OF CHAPMAN.

POINT III.
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

POINT IV.
I F DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

ARGUMENT
PBELIMINABY STATEMENT
Plaintiff's argument appears to be predicated upon
a false premise. He apparently proceeds on the erroneous assumptions that because the accident occurred on
the plaintiff's own right hand side of the road, and that
the defendant's oil truck was at the moment of impact
on the wrong side of the road, that as a matter of law
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the plaintiff was free of fault, and that one or more of
the defendants must have been guilty of some actionable
negligence. Neither of these assumptions is well founded.
In at least four decisions of this court, a driver on
the right side of the road has been held guilty of negligence in failing to avoid collision with an automobile on
the wrong side of the road. In Farrell v. Cameron, 98 Ut.
68, 94 Pac. (2d), 1068, this court affirmed a finding by
the trial court that the defendant was guilty of negligence, in failing to turn out and avoid the autombile
in which plaintiff was riding, and which was approaching
12 to 15 inches across the center line and on the wrong
side of the road. In Ercanbrach v. Ellison, 134 Pac. (2d)
177, the plaintiff was held guilty of negligence, although
entirely on his own right side of the road, in not slowing
up or stopping to permit the defendant's truck to complete the passing of another automobile proceeding toward the plaintiff. In Thomas v. Sadleir, 162 Pac. (2d)
112, the defendant was held liable to a plaintiff who was
riding as a passenger in an automobile traveling partly
on the wrong side of the road, since the defendant failed
to travel in the extreme right hand lane, but was traveling
in the lane nearest the center of the highway. And in
Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Ut. 227, 186 Pac. (2d) 592, the
defendant was held liable to a passenger in its bus, for
failure to avoid striking an automobile which skidded
out of control on a slippery highway, and passed in front
of the defendant's bus. Incidentally, in the case last
cited, the driver of the car which went out of control, and
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into the pathway of the bus, was exonerated from liability.
The cases above cited leave no room for doubt, that
the mere fact that a person is upon his own right hand
side of the highway, does not relieve him from all responsibility to be alert for traffic which may cross his
path, and to avoid collision with such traffic when there
is a reasonable opportunity to do so.
Equally fallacious is plaintiff's contention, that because the truck of the defendant came upon the plaintiff's side of the highway, it must have been negligently
operated. The evidence not only shows without dispute,
but the uniformity of the testimony emphasized, that the
highway at the time and place of the accident was
covered with ice, and was extremely slippery. It is well
settled that the mere fact that ,an automobile skids or
slides on a slippery highway, is not evidence, in and of
itself, of negligence on the part of the operator thereof.
If the automobile was carefully operated, and was caused
to skid through no fault of the operator, but due to the
conditions of the highway beyond his control, then the
operator is not guilty of negligence, and the accident is
deemed unavoidable. See 5A Am. Jur. 346, 347, 439,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Sections 193, and 341.
The same rule has been recognized by this court. In West
v. Standard Fuel Co., 17 Pac. (2d) 292, this court said at
page 294:
" There is no evidence that plaintiff did not
have his automobile under control unless it may
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be said that the fact that his automobile skidded
into the truck is such evidence. Such fact may
not be said to show as a matter of law that plaintiff did not have control of his automobile."
See also 3-4 Huddy, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law,
Section 68, Page 120. The same rule is followed and
numerous cases are cited in support thereof, in the annotations in 58 A.L.E., at page 261, and 113 A.L.E. 992,
both relied upon by the plaintiff.
So far as the defendants Chapman and Continental
Oil Company are concerned, there is no need for speculation or conjecture, as to the cause of the oil truck skidding out of control. The evidence is undisputed that the
oil truck was proceeding northerly on its own side of the
road, and in the proper lane for passing the Hartley
automobile. While thus lawfully proceeding along the
highway, it was struck by the Hartley automobile, which
had momentarily skidded out of the control of its operator, and collided forcibly with the oil truck, thus forcing
the oil truck out of the control of its driver, Chapman,
and across the highway, and into the pathway of the
plaintiff. There is no dispute that the oil truck was
knocked out of control by the Hartley automobile, and
not by any act on the p a r t of its operator.
As we understand the plaintiff's position, he relies
for recovery against the defendants Chapman and Continental Oil Company on two grounds: First, that they
attempted to pass the Hartley automobile, at a too close,
or unsafe distance; and secondly, that the truck was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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11
operated at an excessive rate of speed in view of the conditions then and there existing. We consider these points
seriatim:
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT
CHAPMAN ATTEMPTED TO PASS THE HARTLEY AUTOMOBILE AT A DISTANCE SO CLOSE THAT THE JURY
WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE.

According to the testimony of Mrs. Hartley, she was
proceeding along the extreme right hand edge of the
highway. Her right wheels might have been off the hard
surfaced portion of the road and on to the shoulder.
Officer Levin testified that the lanes of traffic were about
12 feet wide, and that the Hartley car was about six
or seven feet wide. This would leave a distance of at
least five to six feet between the left side of the Hartley
car and the line dividing the two north bound lanes of
traffic. Officer Levin also fixed the point of impact as
one foot west of this dividing line. This would indicate
a clearance distance of at least six to seven feet between
the Hartley car and the oil truck.
The witness Chapman testified that he was near the
center line of the highway, or as he put it, "right against,
or . . . over a little bit" from the center line (T. 91).
He could not properly have proceeded further to the left
without endangering south bound traffic. He also testified that he had "over three feet" or "quite a bit further
than that" of clearance of the Hartley car (T. 91).
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It is difficult to conceive how the defendant Chapman could have allowed more passing distance. Mrs.
Hartley was on the extreme right hand side of the road,
and he was as near the center as he could properly drive.
Clearly the accident occurred, not by reason of any fault
on the part of Chapman, in allowing insufficient clearance of the Hartley automobile, but by reason of the
Hartley automobile suddenly going out of control and
into the oil truck.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT CHAPMAN WAS NOT DRIVING AT
AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPEED, AND THE ACCIDENT
WAS NOT CAUSED BY ANY EXCESSIVE SPEED ON THE
PART OF CHAPMAN.
The argument that the oil truck was proceeding at
an unsafe speed is equally without merit. While the
speed of the truck was established practically without
dispute at about 35 miles per hour at the moment of the
accident, there is no competent evidence in the record
that this was not a safe rate of speed for the truck to
travel; and there is the uncontradicted expert testimony
of Chapman himself, that 35 miles per hour was the
minimum safe speed at which the truck could negotiate
the hill. The plaintiff relies upon the testimony of the
two police officers, fixing the maximum safe speed at
15 to 20 miles per hour. However, as we pointed out in
our statement of facts, such opinions, even if admissible,
were based purely upon the officers' experience in operating ordinary passenger type vehicles. Both admitted,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that they had no knowledge or experience whatsoever
with truck and trailer equipment, ,and admitted, that such
equipment by reason of its much greater weight, larger
number of wheels and other differences, might be safely
operated at a greater rate of speed under the conditions
prevailing on the evening of the accident. Chapman, on
the other hand, who qualified as an expert in handling
of large truck and trailer units, testified that the truck
and trailer could not have been operated up the hill at a
lesser speed than 35 miles per hour without danger of
"spinning out," which would endanger not only that
equipment, but also all other traffic on the highway.
Even if a jury might find that 35 miles per hour
was an excessive rate of speed under the circumstances,
the evidence is clear, and without dispute, that the collision was not caused by speed, but was caused solely by
the Hartley automobile going out of control and colliding with the oil truck. The same result would have occurred, if the truck had been going only 20 miles per hour.
POINT III.
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

As a sort of last resort, the plaintiff suggests that
he should be entitled to go to the jury under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. It requires no extended argument to
demonstrate that the doctrine has no application to the
facts of this case. It is well settled that in order for that
doctrine to apply, the instrumentality causing the damage must have been under the sole and exclusive control
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the defendant, and that the accident must have been
of such a nature that it would not ordinarily occur, except as a result of negligent inspection, use or operation.
Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., (Ut.), 108 Pac. (2d)
254. Neither element is present in this case. The truck
was not in the exclusive control of Chapman and the
Continental Oil Company. On the contrary, it had been
knocked completely out of their control by the independent, intervening act of the defendant
Hartley.
Nor can skidding out of control be said to be such
an event as will not ordinarily occur, except as a
result of negligence on the part of the operator of the
vehicle. On the contrary, courts have long and universally recognized that the most carefully operated vehicle may slide from its operator's control on slick and
slippery roads. 5A Am. Jur., 439, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic, Sec. 341. The case of Barret v. Caddo
Transfer & Warehouse Company, 165 La. 1075, 116 So.
563, 58 A L E 261, cited and relied upon by the plaintiff,
is ample authority on this point. The court there quoted
with approval from Linden v. Miller, 172 Wis. 20, 177
N.W. 909:
"Skidding may occur without fault, and when
it does occur it may likewise continue without
fault for a considerable space and time. It means
partial or complete loss of control of the car
under circumstances not necessarily
implying
negligence. Hence Plaintiff's claim that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present
situation is not well founded. In order to make
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply, it must be
held that skidding itself implies negligence. This
it does not. It is a well-known physical fact that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads without fault either on account of the manner of handling the car, or on account of its being there/9
(Emphasis ours.)
As was picturesquely said in UEcuyer v. Farnsworth, 106 Vt. 180, 170 A. 677:
"The sudden and unexpected skidding of an
automobile is one of the natural hazards of driving cars on icy roads, and it may happen to the
best of operators; and the viatic vagaries of automobiles when skidding on icy roads are as well
known to automobile drivers as those of cows."
Other cases to the same effect are found in the annotation in 58 ALR, commencing at page 269, where it is
said:
"It has been generally held that the mere fact
that an automobile skids on a slippery pavement
does not of itself constitute evidence of negligence
upon the driver's part so as to render the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine applicable."
More recent decisions are collected in the annotation
in 1.1.3 ALR, commencing at page 1014:
Plaintiff relies upon the recent decision of an intermediate appellate court of the state of California, Barrera v. deLaTorre, (Cal. App.), 300 Pac, (2d) 100. We
question the reasoning of the decision, but right or
wrong, there were two distinguishing fact elements present in that case not present here. First, in that case, there
was dispute in the evidence as to whether there had been
an antecedent collision between defendant's vehicle and
a third vehicle which had caused the subsequent collision
with plaintiff's building. This is of great importance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in determining whether defendant had exclusive control.
In the case at bar, the evidence is undisputed, and was
developed by the plaintiff himself, that the oil truck was
knocked out of control by an antecedent collision with
the Hartley automobile, and wholly without fault on the
part of the operator of the oil truck. Secondly, the California case did not involve icy slippery roads, such as
were involved in the case at bar. And as above noted,
skidding out of control on icy roads, does not necessarily
bespeak negligence.
POINT IV.
I F DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

In directing ,a verdict for the defendants, the trial
court took the position that the evidence showed conclusively that the accident was an inevitable or unavoidable
accident, not caused by the fault of any party to this
action. In other words, the trial court found all of the
parties free of negligence. We believe that this holding
is not only supported, but compelled, by the evidence.
However, we further contend that if the defendants were
negligent in any of the particulars claimed by the plaintiff, it must necessarily follow that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence, for the record shows without
dispute, that his conduct was of the same kind and
nature as that of the defendants, and if what the defendants did could be said to be negligence, it must follow
that what the plaintiff did was likewise negligence. If it
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was negligent for this defendant to travel 35 miles per
hour up the hill, it was most certainly negligent for the
plaintiff to travel 30 miles per hour down the hill. The
plaintiff by his own admission had reason to suspect that
the hill would be more icy than the level road, and a car
going down hill is accelerated by gravity, whereas a car
going up hill has the aid of gravity in stopping in the
event of an emergency. Although the plaintiff claims to
have reduced speed between the time he started down
the hill, and the moment of impact, the evidence in this
regard is very vague. However, the evidence is clear that
he appreciated the danger of an accident 50 or 60 feet
before the impact occurred, and that he was neither able
to stop his automobile within that distance, nor was he
able to reduce its speed appreciably. He struck the track
with such force and violence, that both vehicles were
damaged to the extent of $1200, and his own car bounced
back up the hill six or eight feet. This was not a light
blow.
On page 13 of his brief, plaintiff suggests that the
jury had the right to find that Mrs. Hartley was negligent for even trying to negotiate the hill at the time of
the accident. If this be so, the jury must also necessarily
find that Denison was equally negligent in attempting to
do the same thing. Contrary to another statement on
page 13 of plaintiff's brief, Mrs. Hartley testified without
contradiction or dispute, that she had experienced no
difficulty negotiating the hill until the moment when
she suddenly lost control of her car. Denison, on the
other hand, admittedly had difficulty all the way down.
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He first attempted to apply brakes, and found that had
no effect whatsoever. He then shifted into second gear,
and finally as a last resort cut off the ignition. All of
this failed to avoid the accident.
CONCLUSION
Like counsel for the plaintiff, we have been unable
to locate any cases so closely similar in point of fact,
as might be said to be controlling or determinative of the
case at bar. However, the general principles governing
this case, are well settled. There is no evidence from
which a jury might properly find that the defendants
Chapman and Continental Oil Company failed to allow
sufficient clearance in pas-sing the Hartley car, nor is
there evidence to show excessive speed on the part of
these defendants, or that speed on the part of these defendants caused or contributed to cause the accident.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application to
the facts of this case. The plaintiff was guilty of the
same kind of conduct of which he complains on the part
of the defendants. Either the accident was an unavoidable accident, not caused by the negligence of any party,
as held by the trial court, or else the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence, and as such, was equally
culpable for his own loss, and therefore, not entitled to
recover. In either event, the judgment of the trial court
is correct, and should be affirmed.
Eespectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for defendants and respondents
Continental Oil Company and Chapman
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